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Unbundling Efficient Breach: An Experiment 
Maria Bigoni, Stefania Bortolotti, Francesco Parisi, Ariel Porat* 
Forthcoming Journal of Empirical Legal Studies (2017) 
Current law and economics scholarship analyzes efficient breach cases monolithically. The 
standard analysis holds that breach is efficient when performance of a contract generates a 
negative total surplus for the parties. However, by simplistically grouping efficient breach 
cases as of a single kind, the prior literature overlooks that gain-seeking breaches might be 
different from loss-avoiding breaches. To capture these different motives, we designed a 
novel game called Contract-Breach Game where we exogenously varied the reasons for the 
breach — pursuing a gain or avoiding a loss — under a specific performance remedy. 
Results from an incentivized laboratory experiment indicate that the motives behind the 
breach induce sizable differences in behavior; subjects are less willing to renegotiate when 
facing gain-seeking than loss-avoiding breaches, and the compensation premium obtained 
by the promisee is higher. Our analysis suggests that inequality aversion is an important 
driver of our results; indeed, inequality-averse subjects accept low offers more often in 
cases of loss-avoiding breaches than gain-seeking breaches. These results give us insight 
into the preferences and expectations of ordinary people in a case of a breach.  
KEYWORDS: contract damages, efficient breach, motives for breach, Contract-Breach game 
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 …“the essential purpose of a contract between commercial men is actual 
performance and they do not bargain merely for a promise, or for a promise plus the 
right to win a lawsuit ”. 
UCC, Section 2-609, Comment 1 
 
I. Introduction  
 
On the question of efficient breach, there exists a subtle tension between the economic and 
the moral viewpoints. Both perspectives consider the failure to keep a promise excusable in 
at least some subset of cases when the net social benefit of breach is sufficiently large 
(Warkol 1998, p. 321). Yet they do not always agree on the boundary conditions when such 
breaches may be permitted. Assuming Kaldor-Hicks wealth maximization, the standard 
economic analysis contends that if the promisor gains more than the promisee loses from a 
breach, then a damages rule (allowing nonperformance with compensation) will be 
efficient. Moreover, to the extent that expectation damages are perfectly compensatory, and 
the promisee is thereby fully compensated, such a breach would be Pareto efficient, leaving 
neither party in a worse position than if the promisor had in fact performed. In contrast, 
deontological philosophers of contract law take the moral duty to keep one’s promises as a 
foundational principle of contracts, which cannot be brushed aside by cost-benefit analyses 
(Sidhu, 2006; Mather, 1999; Fried, 1981; Shiffrin, 2009, 2012).  
Judicial and lay intuitions seem ambivalent with respect to the notion of efficient 
breach (Warkol, 1998; Baron and Wilkinson-Ryan, 2009; Zamir and Medina, 2010). In 
general, the intuitions of laymen seem to track consequentialist (economic) reasoning in 
cases of loss-avoiding breach, while being deontological (moralist) in cases of gain-seeking 
breach. Consider, for instance, two firms renting a restaurant for their annual event. In the 
first case, the restaurant’s owners try to cancel the reservation due to the sudden demise of 
the chef and asks the firm to breach the contract, offering some compensation, as replacing 
the chef in haste would be too costly. In the second case, instead, the restaurant’s owners 
want to breach the contract because they received a better offer from another group, willing 
to rent the space on the same date. We believe that one might well be more inclined to 
forego performance and ask for a lower compensation in the first (loss-avoiding breach) 
rather than in the second example (gain-seeking breach). This thought experiment suggests 
that the distinction between loss-avoiding and gain-seeking breach may be analytically 
important. 
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 In line with our intuition, survey-based studies conducted in recent years (Baron 
and Wilkinson-Ryan, 2009) suggest that lay intuitions about the excusableness of 
nonperformance are surprisingly nuanced. Survey participants were tolerant of breach in 
cases where the promisor sought to pay damages in lieu of performance to mitigate 
unanticipated costs (“loss-avoiding breach”). Yet they were unwilling to excuse 
performance when the promisor breached to pursue a better deal (“gain-seeking breach”).  
Existing empirical evidence on these issues relies exclusively on anecdotic evidence 
from court cases, and from non-incentivized surveys. Unfortunately, data about actually 
occurring breaches are scarce. Moreover, comparing real-world loss-avoiding and gain-
seeking breaches is difficult, as many important variables – interested parties, amount of 
surplus generated by the contract, available information, etc. – may vary from one case to 
the other, hence making it difficult to draw any inference. Economics reasons, such as 
allocative efficiency, productive efficiency, restrained incentives, information-forcing 
effects, and competitive effects could also drive any observed difference (see Parisi and 
Porat, 2016). In this paper, we adopt a novel approach to the problem, and test whether the 
motives behind a breach are behaviorally relevant by means of a controlled laboratory 
experiment. We utilize an incentivized economic experiment granting tight control over the 
relevant parameters and allowing to exogenously manipulate the variables of interest. We 
indeed understand incentivized experiments as a new and important source of evidence, 
that could complement real-world and survey data.  
We introduce a novel Contract-Breach Game, where buyers and sellers sign a 
binding contract and, afterwards, a shock might occur. We exogenously vary the shock to 
simulate loss-avoiding and gain-seeking breaches. As specific performance remedies apply 
to the contract, the promisee can force the promisor to perform the act(s) stated in the 
contract, unless both parties agree on the compensation and cancel the contract. This study 
is the first to investigate these issues in a non-hypothetical, strategic environment, where 
subjects make decisions with real pecuniary consequences, both for themselves and for 
other participants of the experiment. Our results confirm that, broadly speaking, lay 
intuition finds empirical support: the promisees require a higher compensation to consent 
to gain-seeking than to loss-avoiding breaches. Interesting enough, we can provide a 
behavioral explanation for the observed difference. Our results are in line with behavioral 
arguments suggesting that people dislike highly unequal distributions of wealth (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). More specifically, inequality-averse subjects in 
4 
our experiment are more willing to accept a low offer in cases of loss-avoiding breaches 
than gain-seeking breaches. These findings are consistent with the results of a recent 
experiment by Mittlaender Leme de Souza (2016), who investigates how the perception of 
the moral value of a breach depends on the breach’s consequences, and shows that breaches 
aimed at avoiding unanticipated unequal outcomes are generally considered as moral.  
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the moral and economic 
arguments for efficient breach in the prior literature. In Section 3, we present the Contract-
Breach Game and describe the experimental design. In Section 4, we present the results of 
our experiment, which show that people’s reactions differ with respect to gain-seeking and 
loss-avoiding breaches, while remaining undistinguishable across seller-breaches and 
buyer-breaches – consistent with our intuition. In Section 5, we conclude with a summary of 
our results and possible policy implications. We also explain the limits of our conclusions 
given the design and nature of our experiment. 
 
II. Efficient Breach: Moral vs. Economic Arguments 
 
A representative of the moral perspective on efficient breach is Sheana Shiffrin (2007). 
Shiffrin argues that contracts create two distinct obligations: one legal and one moral. Both 
obligations are grounded in the “promise principle.” In her view, the problem is that, by 
allowing parties to deviate from their legal promise via efficient breach, the law implicitly 
encourages the violation of their moral promise.1 Shiffrin brings to fore the tension 
between the legal and moral norms, questioning the coherence of contract law as being at 
the same time grounded upon and indifferent to promise-keeping.  
Several law and economics scholars have responded to the moral arguments 
against efficient breach, attempting to make the economic argument more palatable for 
non-economists. Shavell (2006) observed that, while efficient breach can be immoral when 
the awarded damages are less than expectation damages, moral considerations should be 
tempered by the understanding that contracts are necessarily incomplete promises and that 
generally parties would have agreed to an expectation damages remedy if they had bothered 
to select a remedy ex ante. Similar arguments arise in the work of other scholars who 
                                                             
1 Shiffrin (2007, p. 708). 
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suggest that the cost-benefit analysis underlying the notion of efficient breach reflects the 
implicit will of the contracting parties (Shavell, 2009; Markovits and Schwartz, 2011 and 
2012).  
Moral theorists have not found these defenses of efficient breach convincing. The 
argument that in a hypothetical complete contract the parties would have included a right 
to breach in their agreement leaves a fundamental question unanswered. If a right to breach 
truly reflects the contracting parties’ preferences and natural expectations (such as to 
amount to the implied will of the majority of them), how do we explain the promisees’ 
distaste for efficient breach even when full compensation is granted?2 Furthermore, 
Macaulay (2000) points out that, although crude practices of efficient breach could be 
observed in one-shot contractual interactions, when parties are involved in a relational 
contract they are less likely to make use of efficient breach. This view is similarly embraced 
by the Official Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code: “This section rests on the 
recognition of the fact that the essential purpose of a contract between commercial men is 
actual performance and they do not bargain merely for a promise, or for a promise plus the 
right to win a lawsuit.” (UCC, Section 2-609, Comment 1). Hence, the question arises again: if 
efficient breach reflects the parties' preferences and natural expectations in one-shot 
relationships, why is it the case that repeat-players do not take advantage of their right to 
breach in their relational contracts?  
A possible answer to these objections comes from a general complaint about 
efficient breach: expectation damages rarely make the promisee whole in practice. This 
complaint is echoed by several authors and is by most scholars accepted as an 
uncontroversial fact in contract practice (Fried, 2007; Goetz and Scott, 1980; Muris, 1983; 
Shavell, 2009). But if imperfect compensation is what drives the wedge between the 
economic and non-economic attitudes toward efficient breach, we should expect the 
promisee’s disappointment for the breach to be a function of under-compensation; or at 
least, the observed distaste for efficient breach should be invariant with respect to the 
circumstances that led to the breach. Yet a survey research by Baron and Wilkinson-Ryan 
(2009) seems to suggest that circumstances matter. In particular, as Wilkinson-Ryan & 
                                                             
2 Macaulay (2000) observes that the presence of other factors is clearly reflected in the promisees’ 
distaste for breach, even when full compensation is granted.   
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Hoffman suggest (2010), since the breach of the contract is conceived by the promisee as an 
exploitation and betrayal, he would suffer a psychological harm and react accordingly.    
These problems and objections challenge the very core of the incomplete-contract 
and implied-consent arguments used by law and economics scholars in defense of efficient 
breach. In this paper we wish to consider these challenges seriously, stepping away from 
the economic vs. non-economic discursive dichotomy, in the search for behavioral evidence 
that could help develop a more nuanced theory of efficient breach and possibly reconcile 
the different views.  
 
III. Experimental design and predictions  
 
To test whether the desirability of the option to breach varies – from a layman’s 
perspective – depending on the circumstances, we designed a Contract-Breach Game in 
which the contract gives the promisee the option to force performance – i.e., specific 
performance.3 Under specific performance, a breach is allowed only if the parties reach an 
agreement to resolve the contract with the payment of compensation by the promisor to the 
promisee. The Contract-Breach Game allows us to study how frequently this efficient 
agreement to breach is reached and whether the compensation paid by the promisor to the 
promisee is higher in some circumstances rather than others. We chose specific performance 
as our background remedy, because only if the occurrence of the breach is conditional on the 
consent of both parties, as is the case with specific performance, it is possible to measure the 
promisee's reaction to loss avoiding and to gain seeking breaches.  
In our novel game, buyers and sellers are forced to enter into an exogenously given 
contract yielding equal profits to both parties. After the contract is formed, an exogenous 
shock may increase the production cost for the seller or decrease the expected value of the 
good for the buyer (loss-avoiding breach), or it may provide either the buyer or the seller a 
more profitable outside option (gain-seeking breach). To test if there is a difference if the 
party asking for a breach is the seller or the buyer, we implemented two treatments. In the 
                                                             
3 This breach remedy is common in European legal systems, where remedies are limited to 
compensatory damages in fewer cases than in common law jurisdictions. (Fransworth, § 12.4, p. 765-
70). Unlike European systems, common law jurisdictions allow unilateral breaches quite liberally, 
protecting promisees only with the award of compensatory damages. 
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Sellers treatment, the shock only impacts the seller, either increasing the production costs 
or introducing the availability of a new opportunity to sell the good. In the Buyers treatment, 
the shock only impacts the buyer, either decreasing the buyer’s valuation of the good, or 
introducing the opportunity to acquire the good elsewhere. 
The experimental methodology allows us to have tight control over all the 
parameters of the game. In naturally occurring contracts, it would be difficult to have a 
precise estimate of many of the relevant parameters, such as the value of the good for the 
buyer, the cost for the seller, or the available alternative contracting opportunities. 
Moreover, the initial price could already incorporate a premium for unrealized but 
foreseeable future circumstances (e.g., possible increase in production costs). The Contract-
Breach game allows us to hold all these variables constant and to manipulate only one 
element at a time.  In the following, we describe the Contract-Breach Game in greater 
detail. 
 
A. Contract-Breach Game 
 
Participants are randomly assigned the role of buyer or seller, and matched in pairs. An 
exogenously given contract stipulates that the seller transfers a good to the buyer for a price 
of 90 experimental currency units (ECUs). The ex-ante production cost for the seller is set to 
80 ECUs, while the ex-ante value of the good for the buyer is set to 100 ECUs. Hence, the 
contract produces a surplus of 20 ECUs to be divided equally between the two parties. After 
the contract is signed, however, an exogenous shock may occur and change the production 
cost or the expected value of the good, or provides a better contract opportunity with a 
third party.4 As we anticipated, the contract is subject to a specific performance remedy, i.e., 
either party can force the other to fulfill the contract obligation.  
We implemented two treatments: Sellers and Buyers (Table 1). In the Sellers 
treatment, the shock only impacts the seller, either increasing the production costs (from 80 
to 110 ECUs) or introducing the availability of a new opportunity to sell the good (at 110 
instead of 90 ECUs). In the former case, the seller may breach the contract to avoid a loss of 
                                                             
4 More details on the likelihood of the shock are provided below. 
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20 ECUs (Table 1, Case 1), while in the latter he may breach to pursue a gain of 20 ECUs 
(Case 2). In the Buyers treatment, the shock only impacts the buyer, either decreasing the 
buyer’s valuation of the good from 100 to 70 ECUs, or introducing the opportunity to 
acquire the good elsewhere (at 70 rather than 90 ECUs). In the former case, the buyer may 
breach to avoid a loss (Table 1, Case 3), while in the latter he may breach to pursue a gain 
(Case 4). Each participant was exposed to only one treatment. 
To better understand the notation and the situation under analysis, consider for 
example Case 1 in Table 1, where the production costs of a seller increase from 80 to 110 
ECUs. If the contract is fulfilled, the seller loses 20 ECUS (recall the selling price is equal to 
90 ECUs); hence the total surplus is negative (-10 ECUs).5 Given the specific performance 
remedy, a promisor can breach the contract only if the promisee agrees, accepting some 
form of monetary compensation, K, in lieu of performance. If the buyer accepts a 
compensation K, the total surplus is 0 ECUs.6 In both treatments, resolution of the contract 
after any type of shock is efficient, as it increases the total surplus by 10 ECUs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
5 In this example the seller loses 20 ECUs and the buyer earns 10 ECUs; the total surplus under 
performance is hence negative (-10 ECUs). 
6 In this case, the seller loses K ECUs and the buyer earns K ECUs; the total surplus under breach is 
hence zero. 
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Table 1:  Four Cases of Efficient Breach 
 
Structure of the stage game. Buyers and sellers are randomly matched in pairs, and go 
through the following steps:7 
Stage 0: the buyer and the seller are informed about the contract terms.  
                                                             
7 In the following, we will describe the game for the Buyers treatment. In the Sellers treatment, roles 
were reversed in stages 2-5. In both treatments, stages 0, 1, and 6 lasted 10 seconds each. 
 
 
Sellers treatment Buyers treatment 
Loss-avoiding breach 
 
Case 1: seller breaches to avoid 
loss (↑ costs=110)  
Contract fulfilled  
𝜋𝑠
𝑐 = −20; 𝜋𝑏
𝑐 = 10; 𝑆𝑐 = −10 
Efficient breach 
𝜋𝑠
𝑏𝑟 = −𝐾; 𝜋𝑏
𝑏𝑟 = 𝐾; 𝑆𝑏𝑟 = 0 
 
 
Case 3: buyer breaches to avoid 
loss (↓ value=70)  
Contract fulfilled   
𝜋𝑏
𝑐 = −20; 𝜋𝑠
𝑐 = 10; 𝑆𝑐 = −10 
Efficient breach 
𝜋𝑏
𝑏𝑟 = −𝐾; 𝜋𝑠
𝑏𝑟 = 𝐾; 𝑆𝑏𝑟 = 0 
 
   
Gain- seeking breach 
Case 2: seller breaches to pursue 
a gain (↑ price=110)  
Contract fulfilled 
𝜋𝑠
𝑐 = 10; 𝜋𝑏
𝑐 = 10; 𝑆𝑐 = 20 
Efficient breach 
𝜋𝑠
𝑏𝑟 = 30 − 𝐾; 𝜋𝑏
𝑏𝑟 = 𝐾; 𝑆𝑏𝑟 = 30 
 
Case 4: buyer breaches to pursue 
a gain (↓ price=70)   
Contract fulfilled  
𝜋𝑏
𝑐 = 10; 𝜋𝑠
𝑐 = 10; 𝑆𝑐 = 20 
 Efficient breach  
𝜋𝑏
𝑏𝑟 = 30 − 𝐾; 𝜋𝑠
𝑏𝑟 = 𝐾; 𝑆𝑏𝑟 = 30 
 
   
Inefficient breach 
Case 5: no variations for the 
seller   
Contract fulfilled 
𝜋𝑠
𝑐 = 10; 𝜋𝑏
𝑐 = 10; 𝑆𝑐 = 20 
Inefficient breach 
𝜋𝑠
𝑏𝑟 = −𝐾; 𝜋𝑏
𝑏𝑟 = 𝐾; 𝑆𝑏𝑟 = 0 
  
Case 6: no variations for the 
buyer   
Contract fulfilled 
𝜋𝑏
𝑐 = 10; 𝜋𝑠
𝑐 = 10; 𝑆𝑐 = 20 
Inefficient breach 
𝜋𝑏
𝑏𝑟 = −𝐾; 𝜋𝑠
𝑏𝑟 = 𝐾; 𝑆𝑏𝑟 = 0 
   
NOTES:  𝜋𝑖
𝑗  denotes the earnings of party i=(s=seller; b=buyer) under the circumstances j=(c=execution 
of contract; br=breach) and K is the accepted compensation to breach the contract. 76 subjects 
participated in the Sellers treatment and 82 in the Buyers treatment. Each subject, regardless of the 
treatment, played the contract-breach game for 18 periods, with random matching, and experienced 6 
negative shocks (loss-avoiding breach), 6 positive shocks (gain-seeking breach), and 6 situations in 
which the initial conditions did not change (inefficient breach).  
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Stage 1: an exogenous shock may happen and the value of the good for the buyer can 
decrease (loss-avoiding breach) or a new seller can be introduced, offering a lower price 
(gain-seeking breach). If none of the two conditions is realized, the terms of the contract 
remain the same as in Stage 0. 
Stage 2: the buyer chooses whether to fulfill his existing obligation or to renegotiate the 
contract.8 If the contract is fulfilled the period is over. 
Stages 3-5: there are at most three renegotiation rounds. In the first one, the buyer can 
offer any positive integer 0≤K≤20, to compensate the seller for the breach of the contract. 
The seller can either accept the offer or enter the second renegotiation round and make a 
counteroffer (between 0 and 20). If the seller makes a counteroffer, the buyer can either 
accept it or make a last counteroffer to the seller. If an offer or counteroffer is accepted, the 
contract is resolved and the parties’ payoffs are determined according to the agreed terms. 
If by the end of the third renegotiation round no agreement is reached, the original contract 
is enforced through specific performance.9 
Stage 6: the parties are informed about the outcome of the renegotiation phase, their own 
earnings, and the earnings of their counterpart. Subjects can always see their cumulative 
earnings (including their initial endowment) on the screen.10  
 
Table 2 presents the payoffs of the two parties in case an offer (K) is accepted by the 
promisee as compensation for the breach. It reveals that any compensation K between 10 
and 20 generates a Pareto-improvement with respect to the outcome that would emerge 
with the performance of the contract. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
8 This option is available even when no shock occurs. 
9 In each round, subjects have 10 seconds to accept an offer, and 30 seconds to make an offer. If a 
subject does not accept or reject the offer within 10 seconds, the offer is automatically rejected, while 
in case no offer is made before the 30 seconds elapse, a counteroffer equal to the most profitable 
option for the offering party is automatically made (20 in Stage 4, and 0 in Stage 5).  
 
10 Subjects are paid for their choices in all 18 periods.  
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Table 2:  Efficient Breach and Accepted Compensation 
 
 
Role 
No Accepted compensation K 
 Breach 0 1 2 [...] 10 [...] 15 [...] 20 
            
Gain- 
seeking 
Promisor - 
Recipient 
10 30 29 28 [...] 20 [...] 15 [...] 10 
Promisee - 
Dictator 
10 0 1 2 [...] 10 [...] 15 [...] 20 
            
Loss- 
avoiding 
Promisor - 
Recipient 
-20 0 -1 -2 [...] -10 [...] -15 [...] -20 
Promisee - 
Dictator 
10 0 1 2 [...] 10 [...] 15 [...] 20 
 
Sequence of events, repetitions, and matching groups. Subjects play 18 periods of the 
stage game, in a fixed role: either as a buyer or as a seller. At the beginning of each period, 
new pairs of buyer and sellers are randomly formed, and identities remain undisclosed. 
This eliminates any reputational concerns and preserves the one-shot nature of the 
contract-breach game.   
The sequence of the events is predetermined and constant across treatments, but 
unknown to subjects. Each event – no-shock, positive shock, and negative shock – occurs 
exactly six times. This implies that in our setup the same person takes decisions in both gain-
seeking and loss-avoiding scenarios, as well as in scenarios in which breach is inefficient 
(i.e., no exogenous shocks occur). Participants are truthfully informed that the sequence of 
the events across periods is given and cannot be influenced by previous transactions. 
However, they are not aware of the frequency with which each event would happen (see 
Instructions in Appendix).  
Our setup resembles situations in which the parties anticipate a breach as a possible 
scenario. While we acknowledge that on some occasions, the breach is a surprise for the 
promisee, sufficiently sophisticated parties (such as business transactors) should anticipate 
at the time of contracting, that the promisor might have an interest to breach in the future, 
and that a renegotiation might follow.  
 
In each session, participants are divided into two matching groups. Pairs of buyers 
and sellers are always formed within each matching group, so the two matching groups in 
12 
each session are independent of each other because there is no possibility of contagion 
between them.11 Participants in the first matching group face the “loss-avoiding” case in the 
first period, the “gain-seeking” case in the second period, and the no-event case in the third 
period. For participants in the second matching group the order of the events in the first 
two periods is reversed. From period 4 onwards, the sequence of the events is randomly 
drawn (with no repositioning) for each of the two matching groups, and is constant across 
all sessions. This set-up allows for a clear comparison across subjects of the effects of gain-
seeking and loss-avoiding breaches on the outcome of the renegotiation.  
We decided to let participant interact for many periods for two main reasons. First, 
there is widespread experimental evidence that subjects might need time to familiarize with 
a novel task in the lab and repeated interaction can facilitate learning and convergence to 
equilibrium. Second, being able to vary the reason behind the breach within the same 
treatment allows for a tighter control over subjects’ behavior, because we can observe how 
the same participants react in response to such an exogenous variation, holding individual 
characteristics constant. This makes it possible to establish a clean causal link between the 
motives of the breach, and the reaction they trigger. Also, remember that in our experiment 
subjects are randomly re-matched at the beginning of every round so to exclude any form of 
reputational effects and preserve the one-shot nature of the strategic situation. 
 
Dictator game and inequality aversion. At the end of the 18 periods of play, subjects are 
randomly matched in pairs and asked to play two dictator games (DG1 and DG2), intended 
to capture individual dispositions toward inequality in a set-up that closely matches the one 
they previously played. In DG1, subjects have to decide how to split 30 ECUs between 
themselves and a randomly chosen counterpart; they can give to the counterpart any 
number of ECUs between 10 and 30. In DG2, subjects must choose how many ECUs 
(between 0 and 20) to transfer from the counterpart's account to their own. All subjects 
played both games in the role of the dictator. Roles of dictator and recipient were assigned 
                                                             
11 We have 4 sessions for each treatment, for a total of 16 matching groups equally divided across 
Sellers and Buyers treatment. Each matching group included between 8 and 12 participants, evenly 
divided between buyers and sellers. In our analyses, we will consider each matching group as an 
independent observation. 
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at random after all subjects made their choices. Only one of the two dictator games was 
selected at random for payment to rule out hedging between decisions. 
As illustrated in Table 2, the payoffs of the dictator in DG1 correspond to those of 
the promisee in the “gain-seeking” case of our Contract-Breach Game, while those of the 
recipient correspond to the payoffs of the promisor. A similar mapping exists between the 
payoffs in DG2 and those of the two parties in the “loss-avoiding” case of the main game. 
However, in the Contract-Breach Game the level of compensation depends on the interplay 
of promisor and promisee, while in the dictator games any type of strategic interaction is 
stripped away and the outcome is completely in the hands of the dictator. By observing 
behavior in a set-up where bargaining does not play any role, we can single out inequality 
aversion as a potential driver of behavior also in the main game. To this aim, it is important 
that payoffs are as comparable as possible between the different parts of the experiment. 
 
Procedures. The experiment involved 158 subjects; 76 in the Sellers treatment and 82 in 
the Buyers treatment.  We conducted 8 sessions – equally divided across treatments – at 
the Bologna Laboratory for Experiments in Social Sciences (BLESS) in April 2013. The 
number of participants in each session ranged from 16 to 22. Two matching groups were 
used in each session, for a total of 8 independent observations per treatment. No subjects 
participated in more than one session. The stage game was repeated for 18 periods, hence 
giving us a total of 684 pairs in the Sellers treatment and 738 pairs in the Buyers treatment. 
Participants were mostly college students recruited through ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The 
experiment was programmed and conducted using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). 
Upon arrival, participants were randomly assigned to private cubicles to avoid eye contact; 
a paper copy of the instructions was distributed before each part, and instructions were 
read out loud to ensure common knowledge.12 Before proceeding to the main part of the 
experiment, all subjects had to correctly answer a series of computerized control questions. 
No form of communication between the participants was allowed in the experiment. The 
average session lasted approximately 1.5 hours. All earnings in the experiment were 
expressed in ECUs and converted at the end of the session at the rate of €1 for every 20 
ECUs. There was no show-up fee, but subjects received an initial endowment of 150 ECUs 
                                                             
12 Instructions are reported in the online Supporting Information. 
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(€7.5) at the beginning of the first period of the contract breach game, to accommodate for 
potential losses, and avoid any issue of limited liability. Subjects were paid privately in cash 
at the end of the session; the average earning was €14.50. 
  
B. Theoretical Predictions and Procedures 
 
In the Contract-Breach Game, rational parties should agree to forego performance of the 
contract whenever either type of event occurs, and the promisee should accept any 
compensation higher than 10; hence, the promisor should offer exactly 11 under both types 
of events. In both DG1 and DG2, dictators should simply maximize their earnings and get 20 
ECUs.  
These standard theoretical predictions focus on objective payoffs and treat all cases 
of efficient breach alike (Posner, 2009). However, there are economic and behavioral 
arguments suggesting that people may actually treat loss-avoiding breaches differently 
from gain-seeking ones. There are at least two relevant strands of the literature that 
provide independent rationales for these behavioral differences. First, there are the 
economic arguments on the effects of a right to breach, such as restrained incentives, 
productive and allocative efficiency that can vary across our four cases. In particular, Parisi 
and Porat (2016) posit that loss-avoiding breaches are more desirable than gain-seeking 
ones, regardless of whether buyers or sellers are the promisors. Second, insights from 
behavioral and experimental economics suggest that people tend to be averse toward highly 
unequal distributions of wealth (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). 
Related evidence from Baron and Wilkinson-Ryan (2009) also points in the same direction.  
In the dictator game, inequality-averse subjects should be willing to sacrifice part of 
their payoff – hence keep less than 20 – in order to reduce the distance between their 
earnings and those of the recipient. In addition, they should keep less in DG1 than in DG2, as 
in DG1 the distance between dictator’s and recipient’s payoffs is minimized when the 
former keeps 0, while in DG2 this happens when the dictator keeps 15. For the same reason, 
in the Contract-Breach Game inequality aversion may induce promisees to accept lower 
offers when the breach is loss-avoiding rather than gain-seeking. 
We thus formulate three hypotheses that will guide our exposition of the results: 
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Hypothesis 1: Promisees will enter the renegotiation phase more often in cases of loss-
avoiding rather than gain-seeking breaches, irrespective of the role of the breaching party. 
Hypothesis 2: The two parties will reach an agreement more often in cases of loss-avoiding 
than in cases of gain-seeking breaches, irrespective of the role of the breaching party. 
Hypothesis 3: When an agreement is reached to allow efficient breach, the promisee will 
obtain a larger share of the surplus as compensation for a gain-seeking breach than for a 
loss-avoiding one. There should be no differences based on the role of the breaching party. 
 
 
IV. Experimental Results 
 
We provide an overview of the results in Table 3, which presents the average per-
transaction profits and surplus by type of breach. The data reveal that the realized (total) 
surplus was significantly lower than the theoretical benchmark in all cases, suggesting that 
subjects were not always able or willing to reach an agreement to avoid the inefficient 
performance of the contract, notwithstanding the efficiency gains from doing so. In addition, 
promisees’ earnings tended to be larger than predicted, while lower than predicted 
earnings were obtained by promisors. This indicates that even when a breach was allowed, 
subjects split the surplus in a way that was generally more favorable to the promisee than 
predicted by theory. 
 
Table 3:  Observed Profits and Theoretical Benchmarks 
 
Event Profit Total 
 Promisee Promisor surplus 
Inefficient breach 9.89 9.77 19.66 
 [9.80, 9.99] [9.56, 9.98] [19.40, 19.93] 
 10.00 10.00 20.00 
 Loss- 11.45 -14.11 -2.66 
avoiding [11.15, 11.75] [-14.67, -13.57] [-3.05, -2.28] 
 11.00 -11.00 0.00 
 Gain- 12.18 14.63 26.80 
seeking [11.75, 12.60] [14.05, 15.21] [26.18, 27.43] 
 11.00 19.00 30.00 
NOTES: The table reports in bold the average profits per period, while in squared brackets it presents the 
95% confidence intervals and in italics the theoretical benchmarks. We have 474 observations for each 
event and role. 
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We shall proceed into an analysis of the results, first considering the frequency with 
which subjects entered the renegotiation stage and the number of efficient breach 
agreements that were reached (Results 1 and 2). We shall then look at the division of the 
surplus between the parties (Results 3 and 4).  
 
Do promisors always enter the renegotiation stage? Is there a difference depending on the 
reason for the breach? 
 
Result 1: Promisors entered the renegotiation phase more often when facing a loss-
avoiding than a gain-seeking breach.  
Figure 1 reports the frequency of (forced) specific performance without 
renegotiation (“no-renegotiation rate”), divided by type of breach.13 In the case of loss-
avoiding breach, nearly all promisors accepted the possibility to renegotiate the contract. 
For gain-seeking breaches a different picture emerges, as the breaching party decides not to 
pursue the renegotiation more than 6% of the time. The difference between loss-avoiding 
and gain-seeking breaches is significant at the 1% level in the first occurrence (Chi-squared 
test, N1=N2=79), and at the 5% level when pooling data from all occurrences (Wilcoxon 
matched pairs test, N1=N2=16, all treatments pooled).14 Results are confirmed by a series of 
probit regressions with individual-level random effects including controls for subjects’ 
individual characteristics and experience (Table A-1 in Appendix). In line with Hypothesis 1, 
this result suggests that the reason for the breach has an impact on the willingness of 
promisors to ask for a renegotiation despite the fact that (i) the breach is always efficient, 
(ii) the surplus generated by the breach is constant across conditions, and (iii) there is no 
cost associated with the renegotiation.  
                                                             
13 In Figure 1 we consider efficient breach cases only. No-renegotiation is 86.4% if there is no shock 
and the frequency of inefficient breaches is 1.7%. This confirms that the experimental subjects 
correctly understood the incentive structure of the situation they faced. 
 
14 We adopt a conservative approach to account for the lack of independence of observations across 
rounds and pairs. If not otherwise specified, the unit of observation is the average at the matching 
group level (N=16). Comparisons between renegotiation rates for gain-seeking and loss-avoiding 
breaches are based on Wilcoxon matched pairs test; comparisons between renegotiation rates in the 
Buyer and Seller treatments are based on Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney tests. Tests for the first 
occurrence are based on Chi-squared tests and treat each pair as an independent unit of observation.  
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Figure 1:  Cases of forced specific performance without renegotiation 
 
 
As shown in Figure 1, the percentage of cases in which promisors choose not to 
attempt renegotiation is higher in the first occurrence, as compared to all occurrences, 
suggesting that subjects learn over time that the breach can be desirable. Notice however 
that the difference is significant only in the Buyers treatment (significant at the 1% level in 
the first occurrence, N1=N2=41, and at the 5% level in all occurrences, N1=N2=8), while in 
the Sellers treatment the entrance rates are not significantly different depending on the 
reason for the breach. 
 
How often do parties that were willing to renegotiate reach an efficient agreement? Do results 
differ depending on the reason for the breach and/or on the identity of the breaching party? 
 
Result 2: For parties that pursued renegotiation, the rates of successful renegotiation do 
not depend on the reason for the breach or the identity of the breaching party. 
 
We report that subjects that were willing to engage in renegotiation reached an 
efficient breach agreement in 73.1% of the cases (Table A-2 in Appendix). In total, efficient 
breach was permitted in 70.7% of the instances; 41.5% of the parties that successfully 
renegotiated the contract reached agreement only in the final round of renegotiation. Only 
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22.1% reached an agreement accepting the first offer made by the promisor. When a loss-
avoiding (gain-seeking) breach occurred, 73.9% (72.3%) of renegotiations were 
successfully concluded. As revealed by a Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test, no significant 
differences emerge depending on the reason for the breach (p-value>0.1); the same is true if 
we consider each treatment separately or the initial occurrence only (p-value>0.1, Pearson 
Chi-squared, N=73).15 
Further, the data indicate that, with experience, reaching an agreement on an 
efficient breach becomes easier. In the first occurrence of a shock, conditional on 
renegotiation, parties reached an agreement only 58.5% of the time; this percentage jumps 
to 81.0% in the final occurrence of a shock, and the difference is highly significant, 
according to a Wilcoxon signed-rank test (p-value<0.01, N=32).16 We also find that the 
success rate of the renegotiation is not significantly influenced by the identity of the 
breaching party. Results are similar if we consider only the first occurrence.  
These results suggest that once parties accept the idea of engaging in renegotiation, 
they are able to carry out renegotiation successfully at the same rate, regardless of the 
reasons of the underlying breach. However, the reasons for the breach affect the way the 
surplus is split between the parties, as discussed below.  
 
How do the parties split the surplus of an efficient breach? Does the compensation obtained by 
the promisee vary depending on the reason for the breach and/or the identity of the breaching 
party? 
 
As we noted above, in all circumstances where breach is efficient, the promisee 
should receive compensation of 11, which means that he should earn 10% more by 
breaching the contract than when no breach takes place. Let us define the “compensation 
premium” as the percentage difference between the compensation obtained by the 
promisee, and the payoff he would get through actual performance: CP=(K-10)/10. 
                                                             
15 The rates of success of the renegotiation phase are 72.1% (loss-avoiding breaches) vs. 69.9% 
(gain-seeking breaches) in the Sellers treatment, and 75.6% vs. 74.6% in the Buyers treatment. 
 
16 A similar pattern is observed for both types of breaches: the rate of successful renegotiation goes 
from 60.7% to 79.3% for gain-seeking breaches (p-value<0.05, N=16) and from 56.4% to 82.7% for 
loss-avoiding breaches (p-value<0.01, N=16). 
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Figure 2:  Compensation premium 
 
 
Figure 2 reports the average compensation premium obtained by the promisee 
when the efficient breach took place. Overall, the promisee received a compensation 
premium of 26.1%, which is markedly higher than what the standard theory predicts. 
Indeed, the median accepted offer was 13 ECUs (i.e., CP=30%). 
 
Result 3(a): The compensation premium obtained by the promisee is higher for gain-
seeking breaches than loss-avoiding breaches.  
In line with our Hypothesis 3, we observe significant differences in the division of 
the surplus generated by the breach (which is always equal to 10 ECUs), depending upon 
the reason for the breach. Actual compensations were 12.0 ECUs in loss-avoiding and 13.2 
ECUs in gain-seeking breaches. This generated an average compensation premium of 20.2% 
for loss-avoiding breaches, and 32.0% for gain-seeking breaches (Figure 2), and the 
difference is significant at the 1% level (N=16). 17  Results are confirmed by linear 
regression models with individual-level random effects and including controls for subjects’ 
                                                             
17  Comparisons between offers and compensations between loss-avoiding and gain-seeking 
breaches are based on Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney tests for Period 1, and on Wilcoxon matched pairs 
tests when considering all periods.  
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individual characteristics and for possible time trends (Table A-3 in Appendix, Model 1-2). A 
significant disparity in compensation premiums emerged both when the breaching party 
was the buyer, and when it was the seller (p-value<0.05, N=8; Table A-3, Model 3 and 4). 
Interestingly, the difference in premiums between the two reasons for the breach emerged 
only as the game progressed. Despite the compensation premium being larger for gain-
seeking (17.4%) than loss-avoiding breaches (7.6%), in the first occurrence of the shock, 
the difference is not significant at any conventional level.  
 
Result 3(b): The compensation premium obtained by the promisee for the efficient breach 
is not affected by the role of the promisor. 
The identity of the breaching party does not seem to have a significant impact on the 
average compensation premium obtained by the promisee, which is on average 27.9% in 
the Seller treatment, and 24.3% in the Buyer treatment (p-value>0.1, N1=N2=16). This result 
is consistent with the expectations expressed in the second part of Hypothesis 3. However, a 
caveat is required here: the framing of our experiment is only minimally characterized in 
terms of the differences between the roles of buyers and sellers, and the efficiency concerns 
that might emerge in real-life situations (Parisi and Porat, 2016) were not likely to emerge 
in the laboratory.18  
 
Can individual attitudes toward inequality explain observed differences in compensation 
premiums?  
 
Result 4: Inequality-averse subjects accept low offers more often in cases of loss-avoiding 
breaches than gain-seeking breaches. 
Data from renegotiation suggest that higher compensation premiums are required 
in cases of gain-seeking breach than in cases of loss-avoiding breach. Despite efficiency 
gains from the breach and the range of the compensation premium being identical across 
the types of breaches, one should note that the degree of inequality—i.e., the distance 
between promisor's and promisee's earnings—associated with each compensation level K 
                                                             
18 Roles were indeed assigned randomly and, for instance, there was no difference between buyers 
and sellers with respect to the reversibility of the investments or the effect on competitiveness. 
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varies depending on the nature of the breach. Whereas inequality monotonically increases 
as the premium increases in cases of loss-avoiding breach, inequality is minimized with a 
50% compensation premium (i.e., an accepted offer of 15 ECUs) in cases of gain-seeking 
breach (see Table 2). A subject that dislikes inequality may be willing to accept a small 
(perhaps even negative) premium in the loss-avoiding case to reduce the distance between 
the earnings of the two parties. However, the same subject might ask for a high premium in 
the gain-seeking case, as this would help reduce inequality. We therefore conjecture that 
inequality-averse subjects may accept low offers for loss-avoiding breaches, but that they 
will tend to be less inclined to do so for gain-seeking breaches.  
To shed light on the link between inequality and compensation premiums, let us 
classify promisees into two categories based on DGs’ choices: inequality-tolerant and 
inequality-averse. To this end, we first define the inequality index, I, as the sum of the payoff 
differences between the two parties in DG1 and DG2. Let us call xi the amount of money 
given to the recipient, and yi the amount of money kept by the dictator, in game i. The 
inequality index I is: 𝐼 = |𝑥1– 𝑦1| +  |𝑥2– 𝑦2|. The average inequality index for promisees 
was 35 and the median value was 46.19 We hence classify subjects that have an index below 
the median as being inequality-averse, and those with an index equal or above the median 
as being inequality-tolerant.  
Let us now consider low offers—i.e., offers less than or equal to 10—and test 
whether inequality-tolerant and inequality-averse subjects respond differently. Overall, 
10.7% of the promisees accepted low offers; meaning, they accepted no or negative 
premiums to allow for a breach. The fraction increases to 15.8% if we only consider 
inequality-averse subjects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
19 In DG1 (DG2), 37.3% (44.3%) of the subjects did not act as self-interested profit-maximizers and 
nearly all deviations from self-interest aimed to reduce the distance between dictator’s and 
recipient’s earnings. Overall, 48.1% of the subjects acted selfishly in both DGs. 
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Figure 3:  Acceptance rates of low offers 
 
 
Figure 3 reports the acceptance rate of low offers organized by the type of subject 
(i.e., inequality-averse or inequality-tolerant) and by the type of breach. In cases of gain-
seeking breach, 8.1% of inequality-averse and 3.9% of inequality-tolerant subjects accepted 
low offers. In cases of loss-avoiding breach, the numbers more than doubled: 21.8% of 
inequality-averse subjects accepted a negative or zero compensation premium to release 
the promisor from the contract. Our data show that inequality-averse subjects accept less 
generous offers in cases of loss-avoiding breach – possibly to prevent promisors from 
incurring high losses.  
Further support for Result 4 is provided by a probit regression (Table 4). The 
dependent variable has the value 1 if a low offer is accepted and 0 if it is refused. 
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Table 4:  Inequality-Aversion and Low Offers 
 
Dep var: 
Accept(1)/Reject(0) Coefficient SE 
Gain-seeking       -0.341     (0.215) 
Inequality-Averse    0.374 **  (0.188) 
Gain-seeking x Inequality-averse -0.252     (0.287) 
Male                 -0.246     (0.155) 
Age                  0.000     (0.017) 
Experience           -0.237 **  (0.110) 
Low Understanding    0.489 **  (0.200) 
N.obs.               888 
   
NOTES: Probit regression on acceptance of low offers (≤ 10), individual 
random effects. Symbol ** indicates significance at the 5% level. Cases 
in which no shocks occurred are not included in the regression. Gain-
seeking: 1=gain-seeking breach, 0=loss-avoiding breach. Inequality-
averse: 1=inequality-averse promisee, 0=inequality-tolerant promisee. 
 
 
 Regression results suggest that the probability of acceptance of a low offer is 
smaller in cases of gain-seeking breaches than in cases of loss-avoiding breaches (i.e., the 
negative coefficient of the variable Gain-seeking), but the effect is significant only for 
inequality-averse subjects.20 The positive and significant coefficient of the dummy variable 
Inequality-Averse confirms the intuition that inequality concerns correlate with a greater 
willingness to accept low offers. Results are robust to a series of controls for gender, age, 
experience, and understanding.21 
 
 
                                                             
20 A t-test confirms that the sum of the coefficients for Gain-seeking and Gain × Inequality-averse is 
highly significant (p-value<0.01). 
 
21 Male is a dummy variable taking value 1 for males and 0 otherwise; Age is the age of the subject; 
Experience takes the value 1 if the subject is unexperienced, 2 if he participated in at most 2 
experiments, and 3 if he participated in 3 or more experiments. To account for possible 
comprehension problems, we considered subjects that were particularly slow in answering the 
control questions, and those who made several mistakes. We attribute value 1 to the dummy variable 
Low understanding for all subjects who were in the last decile either according to their total 
answering time, or according to their total number of mistakes. 
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V. Discussion and Conclusions  
 
In this paper, we tried to explain the disparity between economic analyses of efficient 
breach and the prevailing positions in the moral philosophy of contracts. We argued that a 
more nuanced economic understanding of the different kinds of efficient breach is desirable 
and that behavioral motives should be taken into account to understand lay people’s 
intuitions under different breach circumstances. We developed a new experimental 
paradigm, dubbed Contract-Breach Game, to empirically test the desirability of different 
types of breaches under specific performance. The experimental toolbox allowed us to have 
a control over all the relevant variables in a way that would not be possible with real-world 
data. We exogenously manipulated the reasons for a breach – loss-avoiding vs gain-seeking 
– by introducing random shocks. Our test subjects had to bargain under different scenarios 
with real financial incentives: their breaching decision determined their final payments. Our 
experimental results highlight that loss-avoiding breaches are more desirable than gain-
seeking breaches; this is especially true for subjects who display stronger egalitarian 
preferences.  
We acknowledge that it is impossible to imitate real life situation in a laboratory, 
and our experiment is no exception. Indeed, in a laboratory environment, subjects do not 
behave exactly as they would have behaved in real life situations, but still there is much to 
learn from their behavior. Our experiment's results – based on the repeated experience of a 
one-shot game – are more indicative of repeat players, who get used to modifications and 
adjustments of contracts, as is the case in many business environments. The results of our 
experiment indicate that individuals exhibit different attitudes toward loss avoiding and 
gain seeking breaches, and those different attitudes must be indicative of the parties' 
expectations from a breach even in discrete breach cases between non-business parties.22  
Our laboratory evidence shows that lay people's intuitions, and moral philosophers' 
arguments regarding efficient breach, are consistent with the economic rationale of efficient 
breach. Efficiency arguments examined by Parisi and Porat (2016) and moral values seem 
                                                             
22 See Feldman & Teichman. 2010, for the argument that people's reaction to breach depends among 
other things on the type of the contract. The authors show, through experiments, that people are 
more averse to a breach of a negotiated contract as opposed to a standard form contract. 
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to go hand in hand: a finding that is in line with Binmore’s (2005) view, that ethics is the 
outcome of an evolutionary process that tends to push the society toward the equilibrium 
which is collectively more profitable.  
Our experimental findings and the observed reactions of our subjects reflect the parties' 
values and expectations and may be used to inform the choice of remedies in different cases 
of efficient breach. Specifically, we show that individuals are more tolerant to loss-avoiding 
breaches – we should thus allow loss-avoiding breaches more easily, and compensatory 
damages may be viewed as the most appropriate remedy in those cases. Conversely, 
individuals are less tolerant to gain-seeking breaches – we should thus discourage those 
breaches, and specific performance or disgorgement damages may become more desirable 
in those cases.  
As a final observation, it should be noted that in the framework of our experiment, 
we assumed that the contract was enforced with a remedy of specific performance (a 
property rule, in Calabresi and Melamed's (1972) terminology), rather than a damage 
remedy (a liability rule, under the same terminology), as is the case with unique good 
contracts.23 As previously explained, we chose specific performance as our background 
remedy, because it made the non-performance of the contract conditional on the consent of 
both parties, rather than on the promisor alone. This allowed us to measure the promisee's 
reaction to loss-avoiding and gain-seeking breaches. In regimes that adopt a damage 
remedy, rather than specific performance, the promisor, rather than the promisee, would 
have the last word as to whether performance takes place. In such cases, if the performance 
of the contract remains efficient after the shock, the promisee would need to entice the 
promisor to perform, offering an additional payment. The direction of the payment would 
hence change: promisor to promisee under specific performance; promisee to promisor 
under damages. Whether our findings could hold when the background remedy is damages 
is a question that warrants future investigation to measure the effect of a change in 
remedies on the parties’ renegotiation.  
                                                             
23 In Continental Europe, specific performance is considered to be the primary remedy in contracts, 
while under Anglo-American common law expectation damages is the primary remedy. Under both 
legal regimes, however, the common remedy for unique good contracts is specific performance. 
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Appendix: Tables 
 
Table A-1:  Treatment effect on no-entrance rate 
 
 Dep. Var.: No renegotiation 
 Pooled Sellers Buyers 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Gain-seeking      1.276 *** 1.537 *** 1.022 **  1.995 *** 
                     (0.294)     (0.319)     (0.463)     (0.490)  
Occurrence                         -0.664 *** -1.267 **  -0.413  
                                   (0.248)     (0.525)     (0.311)  
Occurrence x Gain               0.029 **  0.055 **  0.019  
                                   (0.012)     (0.026)     (0.015)  
Male                               -1.273 *** -0.575     -1.736 **  
                                   (0.470)     (0.486)     (0.763)  
Age                                0.045     0.053 **  0.067  
                                   (0.036)     (0.022)     (0.132)  
Experience                         0.473     0.141     0.789  
                                   (0.353)     (0.400)     (0.535)  
Low Understanding                  1.572 *** 1.379 *** 1.689 **  
                                   (0.486)     (0.507)     (0.725)  
N.obs.               948     948     456     492  
 
NOTES: Probit regression on No Entrance (1=no entrance; 0=entrance) with individual random effects. 
Symbols $***$ and $**$ indicate significance at the 1% and 5%, respectively. Occurrence indicates the 
number of times a given event has occurred, and ranges from 1 to 6. Male is a dummy variable taking value 
1 for males and 0 otherwise; Age is the age of the subject; Experience takes value 1 if the subject is 
inexperienced, 1 if he participated in at most 2 experiments, and 3 if he participated in 3 or more 
experiments. We attribute value 1 to the dummy variable Low understanding for all subjects who were in 
the last decile either according to their total answering time, or according to their total number of mistakes 
in the control questions. 
 
Table A-2:  Rates of Success, Conditional on Renegotiation 
 
Event Seller  Buyer Total 
Loss-avoiding breach 0.721 ∼ 0.756 0.739 
 ∼  ∼ ∼ 
Gain-seeking breach 0.669 ∼ 0.746 0.723 
Total 0.710 ∼ 0.751 0.731 
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Table A-3:  Treatment Effect on Compensation Premium 
 
 Dep. Var.: Compensation Premium 
 Pooled Sellers Buyers 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Gain-seeking      11.544 *** 10.576 *** 10.745 *** 12.58 *** 
                     (2.004)     (2.812)     (2.926)     (2.727)     
Buyer                                 -1.327                                    
                                      (3.460)                                    
Buyer x Gain                      2.018                                    
                                      (3.996)                                    
Male                                  7.459 **  7.994 **  5.433  
                                      (2.905)     (3.753)     (4.249)  
Age                                   -0.099     -0.237     -0.105  
                                      (0.333)     (0.758)     (0.380)  
Experience                            3.85 *   0.07     6.309 **  
                                      (2.177)     (3.154)     (2.891)  
Low Understanding                     -19.446 *** -31.726 *** -13.364 *** 
                                      (3.734)     (5.906)     (4.650)  
N.obs.               665     665     334     331  
R-squared            0.043     0.155     0.166     0.166  
 
NOTES: Linear regression on compensation premium with individual random effects. Symbols $***$, 
$**$, and $*$ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Test on joint significance of 
Buyer and Buyers x Gains in Model (2) p=0.874. Male is a dummy variable taking value 1 for males and 0 
otherwise; Age is the age of the subject; Experience takes value 1 if the subject is inexperienced, 1 if he 
participated in at most 2 experiments, and 3 if he participated in 3 or more experiments. We attribute value 
1 to the dummy variable Low understanding for all subjects who were in the last decile either according to 
their total answering time, or according to their total number of mistakes in the control questions. 
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Supporting Information 
Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the 
publisher’s website: 
 
Experimental Instructions 
Figure SI-1: Scenario 1 
Figure SI-2: Scenario 2 
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Supporting Information for 
Unbundling Efficient Breach: An Experiment  
Maria Bigoni, Stefania Bortolotti, Francesco Parisi, Ariel Porat 
 
Experimental Instructions 
Here we report the instructions for the “Seller” treatment. Instructions for the “Buyer” 
treatment are available from the authors upon request. The parts in [italics] were red by the 
experimenter, but not printed on the subjects’ copy of the instructions. 
 
Instructions 
Welcome. The purpose of this study is to investigate how people make decisions. From now 
until the end of the study, any communication with other participants is not allowed. If you 
have a question, please raise your hand and one of us will come to your desk to answer it. 
In this experiment, you will be able to earn money depending on your choices and the 
choices of the other participants. Upon completion of the study, the amount you earned will 
be paid to you in cash. Payments are confidential; no other participant will be told the 
amount you earned. All earnings are expressed in tokens, which will be converted to Euros 
at the end of the study at the rate of 1 Euro = 20 tokens. 
In this study there will be two parts: I am now about to read the instructions for the first 
part. 
 
Instructions for Part 1 
Roles and tasks: At the beginning of the study, each participant will be assigned one of two 
roles: Seller or Buyer. Half of you will be assigned the role of Seller, and half of you will be 
assigned the role of Buyer. Your roles will be generated by the computer and will remain 
fixed throughout the the study. Each Seller will be matched with one Buyer, and the two 
parties will be involved in a transaction. 
The Seller produces a good, and the expected production cost for each good is equal to 
80 tokens. The Buyer expects to receive a benefit of 100 tokens from the purchase of the 
good. The transaction is articulated in five phases. 
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Phase 1: Contract. The good is sold by the Seller to the Buyer, at a price of 90 tokens.  
On the left side of the screen, you can see that the price is 90 and the production cost is 80, 
so the Sellers earnings from the contract will be 10 tokens (price minus production cost). 
Likewise, on the right side of the screen, you will see that the price is 90 and the benefit 
to the Buyer is 100, so the Buyers earnings from the contract will also be 10 tokens (benefit 
minus price). 
In this phase of the experiment, there are no decisions to make, and the contract is 
binding for both parties. [Please, press OK.] 
Phase 2: Variation in the initial conditions. In this phase of the experiment, there can be 
a change in the initial conditions presented in phase 1. There are three possible scenarios: 
A. The production costs of the Sellers unexpectedly increase from 80 tokens to 110 
tokens. In this case, if the contract is performed as promised, the Seller loses 20 
tokens (price minus production costs), while the Buyer still earns 10 tokens. [Please, 
press OK]. 
B. The Seller finds a better selling opportunity; that is, he could sell the good to a 
different buyer at the higher price of 110 tokens. In this case, the Seller earns 10 
tokens if he performs the contract as promised. If the Seller breaches the contract, 
he earns 30 tokens by selling the good to the new buyer (at a price of 110 tokens 
minus his production cost of 80 tokens); however, in this case the original Buyer 
would earn 0 tokens, as someone else will get to buy the good in his place. 
C. Nothing changes with respect to Phase 1. 
Both parties are informed if any variation in the initial conditions occurred. Please note that 
if the contract is performed as promised, the earnings for the Buyer remain the same (10 
tokens) in all three situations. If the contract is not performed, the Buyer loses his benefit 
from the contract and obtains 0 tokens, plus whatever compensation is agreed upon in 
Phase 3. [Please, press OK] 
Phase 3: Perform the contract or ask for a renegotiation. The Seller cannot breach the 
contract, without the consent of the Buyer. The Seller has two options: he can perform the 
contract as promised in Phase 1 or he can renegotiate the contract. 
• If the contract is performed as promised the Buyer earns 10 tokens and the Seller 
earns either 10 tokens (under scenarios B and C) or - 20 tokens (under scenario A). 
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If the Seller decides to fulfill the contract, the transaction is completed (i.e., the 
Buyer and the Seller will not enter into Phase 4); 
• If the Seller asks to renegotiate the contract he can make an offer to the Buyer as 
compensation for breaching the contract. In this case, the Buyer and the Seller enter 
into Phase 4 (renegotiation). 
If the renegotiation leads to an agreement between the two parties, then the original 
contract is cancelled and is replaced by the new agreement. Under scenarios A and C, if the 
original contract is breached the good is not produced and the Seller does not bear any 
production cost (and does not get any payment for selling the good, since there is no good to 
sell). Under scenario B, if the original contract is breached the Seller can produce the good 
and sell it to the external buyer. 
If the Seller and the Buyer do not reach an agreement, the original contract is performed as 
promised. 
Phase 4: Renegotiation. Parties have 4 rounds of renegotiation available to modify the 
original contract. Parties will alternate in making offers and counter-offers. If no agreement 
is reached by the end of the 4th round, the original contract is implemented. 
• In the first round of renegotiation, the Seller can make an offer to the Buyer as 
compensation for breaching the contract. The Seller has 30 seconds to make his 
decision: you can see the remaining time on the top of your screen. The minimum 
offer is 0 and the maximum offer is 20. [Note: Please, look at the screen: can you see a 
red cursor? To make an offer you simply need to move the cursor] 
– Example 1: suppose you are the Seller and your production costs have 
increased. Suppose you want to make an offer of 5 tokens to the Buyer to 
breach the contract. [Please, move the cursor so to set an offer of 5.]   
How much would you earn in this case?   
If the Buyer accepts the offer, the contract is not performed and you lose 5 
tokens (i.e., the amount you offered as compensation to the Seller for 
breaching the contract). [Note: your earnings are reported on the right side of 
the screen]. On the bottom-left side of the screen you can see a graph 
reporting the offer for each renegotiation round; the graph will display all 
the offers and counter-offers. [The purple cue in the graph moves as the offer 
changes.] In this case, the Buyer earns 5 tokens.   
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If the Buyer refuses your offer, there will be 3 additional rounds of 
renegotiating. How much do you earn if you don’t reach an agreement by the 
end of the last renegotiation round? Your earnings are equal to - 20 tokens 
(i.e., you will face a loss of 20). That is, because you received 90 tokens (i.e., 
the price in the original contract), but you faced a cost of 110 tokens (i.e., the 
production costs after the unexpected variation). The Buyers earnings will 
remain equal to 10 tokens, as in the original contract. [You can find your 
earnings for this case in the right part of the screen.]   
If you do not press OK within the 30 seconds your offer is not transmitted to 
the Seller. In the left part of the screen you can see a graph with the 
renegotiation round and the corresponding offer: the graph will display all 
the offers and counter-offers. [Can you see that the purple cursor moves as 
you change the offer? Please, press OK.] 
– Example 2: Suppose you are the Seller and you have found a better selling 
opportunity. Suppose you want to make an offer of 5 tokens to the Buyer to 
breach the contract and be able to sell the good to a new buyer for a higher 
profit. [Please, move the cursor so to set an offer of 5 tokens.]   
How much would you earn in this case?   
If the Buyer accepts the offer, you can breach the original contract and you 
can sell the good at the higher price. Your earnings in this case are equal to 
25 tokens. Why 25 tokens? From the new contract you earn 30 tokens (110 
tokens from the new higher selling price - 80 tokens of production costs). 
You have to pay 5 tokens to the Buyer to breach the original contracts; hence 
you earn 30 tokens (from the new contract) - 5 tokens (compensation paid 
to Buyer to breach the initial contract) [Note: your earnings are reported on 
the right side of the screen]. In this case, the Buyer earns 5 tokens. If the 
Buyer rejects your offer, there will be 3 additional rounds of renegotiation.  
How much do you earn if you don’t reach an agreement by the end of the last 
renegotiation round? Your earnings are equal to 90 tokens (price in the 
original contract) - 80 tokens (production costs) = 10 tokens. The Buyers 
earning are equal to 10 tokens, as in the original contract. [Note: you can 
read the earnings for the case of renegotiation failure on the bottom-right side 
of the screen]. [Please, press OK.]   
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Please recall that the Seller have 30 seconds to state his offer. If the Seller 
does not press OK within 30 seconds, the offer will be equal to 0 tokens. 
• In the second round of renegotiation, the Buyer is informed about the Sellers offer 
and has to decide whether to accept or reject it. If he accepts the offer, the original 
contract is cancelled and renegotiation ends. If he rejects the offer, he has to state a 
counter-offer. The Buyer has 10 seconds to decides whether to accept or reject: if he 
takes no action within 10 seconds the offer is automatically rejected. If the Buyer 
rejects the offer, than he has 30 seconds to state a counter-offer. If the Buyer do not 
press OK within 30 seconds, the offer will be equal to 20 tokens. 
• In the third round of renegotiation, the Seller is informed about the Buyers counter-
offer and has to decide whether to accept or reject it. If he accepts the counter-offer, 
the original contract is cancelled and renegotiation ends. If he rejects the counter-
offer, he has to state a new offer. The Seller has 10 seconds to decides whether to 
accept or reject: if he takes no action within 10 seconds the offer is automatically 
rejected. If the Seller rejects the offer, than he has 30 seconds to state a counter-
offer. If the Seller does not press OK within 30 seconds, the offer will be equal to 0 
tokens. 
• In the fourth round of renegotiating, the Buyer is informed about the Sellers new 
offer and has to decide whether to accept it or to reject it. If the Buyer accepts the 
offer, the original contract is cancelled. If the new offer is rejected, the original 
contract is performed. Regardless of the choice made by the Buyer, this last round 
ends the renegotiation, and Phase 4 ends. The Buyer has 10 seconds to decides 
whether to accept or reject: if he takes no action within 10 seconds the offer is 
automatically rejected. 
Phase 5: Earnings. The screen will display your earnings for the period, the cumulated 
earnings, and the earnings of your counterpart for the period. 
We now ask you to answer a few questions, to verify that the instructions given so far are 
clear for everybody. The answers you give to these questions will not affect your earnings in 
any way. 
Periods, groups, and private account. The task will be repeated for 18 periods. In each 
period the computer will form groups of two – one Seller and one Buyer. You can see the 
number of the current period in the upper-left corner of the screen. In Phase 2 of each 
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period, one of the three scenarios (A, B, or C) occurs. The sequence of the events is 
predetermined by the computer and cannot be influenced in any way by your previous 
actions. 
At the beginning of the first period, an endowment of 150 tokens will be deposited in your 
private account. Per-period earnings will cumulate in your account as well. In case you were 
to suffer a loss in a period, the tokens will be subtracted from your private account. In the 
upper-right part of the screen, you can see the balance of tokens in your private account. 
To sum up. At the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly assigned to the role of 
Seller or Buyer: the roles will remain fixed throughout the experiment. There will be 18 
periods, and at the beginning of each period the computer will match one Seller and one 
Buyer. In each period: 
• The contract is signed; 
• There can be a change in the initial conditions for the Seller: an increase in the 
production costs or a better outside selling opportunity. The occurrence of each 
event is predetermined by the computer and does not depend in any way from your 
previous choices. You cannot know in advance the future sequence of events; 
• The Seller can perform the original contract as promised or renegotiate the 
agreement with the Buyer; 
• There will be at most 4 rounds of renegotiation. The Seller will make the first offer 
to breach the contract. If there is no agreement at the end of the fourth round, the 
original contract is performed. 
Earnings accumulate from period to period and are added to (or subtracted from) your 
private account. [Is everything clear?] Before starting, please answer a few additional 
questions. 
 
 
Instructions for Part 2 
Decision task. In this part you must decide how to allocate some tokens. You have to take 
two decisions: one for scenario 1 and the other for scenario 2. 
In Figure 1 you can see scenario 1: each cell represents a possible allocation. Please look at 
the first cell in the upper-left corner: in this distribution you get 0 tokens and the other gets 
 37 
30. In the next allocation, you get 1 and the other gets 29. In the last allocation, in the 
bottom-right corner, you get 20 and the other gets 10. To select the favorite allocation, you 
have to press on the desired cell and confirm your choice.  
Figure SI-1: Scenario 1 
 
 
Let us now consider scenario 2 in Figure 2. As before, each cell represents a given allocation 
of tokens between you and another participant. Please look at the first cell in the upper-left 
corner: in this distribution you get 0 tokens and the other gets 0. In the next allocation, you 
get 1 and the other loses 1 token. In the last allocation, in the bottom-right corner, you get 
20 and the other loses 20 tokens. 
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Figure SI-2: Scenario 2 
 
 
Groups and earnings. Each one of you will take 2 decisions: one for each scenario. The 
computer will forms randomly groups of two and only one decision for each group will be 
carried over. The implemented choice could hence be your choice or the choice of the other 
person in your group. In addition, the relevant choice could be the one for scenario either 1 
or 2. You will know whether your choice will be implemented only at the end of the studio; 
please pay attention to all your choices. 
 
